Averroes (d. 1198) explains why Scripture addresses its adherents in different ways in the Fasl al-Maqal, II.11-12, 15 (ed. Hourani, Leiden: 1959, emphasis mine):
.والسبب في ورود الشرع فيه الظاهر والباطن هو اختلاف فطر الناس و تباين قرائحهم في التصديق
And tasdiq, he clarifies there, is either burhani (demonstrative), jadali (dialectical), or khitabi (rhetorical).
Shams al-Din Isfahani (d. 1348), Tasdid al-Qawa’id fi’l-sharh al-Tajrid al-‘Aqa’id (Kuwait: 2012), 772:
Know that knowledge (al- ͑ilm) is  sometimes applied and by it is meant the occurrence of the form of a thing in the intellect. It is divided [1.1] into bare conceptualization (taṣawwur muṭlaq) – like our conception ‘the sun’, and ‘the moon, and ‘the intellect’ – and [1.2] into conceptualization with assent (taṣdīq) – like knowing that the world is temporally originated (muḥdath). Assent is a judgment, by negation or affirmation, between two things. And  other times [knowledge] is applied and by it is meant certainty (al-yaqīn), and is [as such] a division of assent because it is an assent qualified by jazm, thubāt, and muṭābaqa. [As such] it is not divided into conceptualization and assent that is firmly convinced (jāzim), corresponds (muṭābiq), and justified (thābit); for a thing is not divided into itself and into something different from itself.
Sriharsha (d. circa 1225), a philosopher belonging to the non-dualist Vedanta school of Hindu philosophy, rejected, contra the evident facts of experience, real multiplicity or differences in the world. One reason he did so, apparently, was on following grounds (tr. Ganganatha Jha):
Continue reading “A disarming of a Vedantist sophism”