The return of the non-existent

Suppose some x comes into existence at t, persists for a while, and then ceases to exist. Question is: can x ‘return’ (yu’ād) to existence, say at t’? Assume that sort of thing can happen. If so, then would also have to return to existence alongside x, insofar as it is a part of what individuates x as x. But in that case, t and t’ would be identical; and therefore, x’s return to existence would be the same thing as its beginning of existence. But that’s clearly a contradiction. And thus, the initial assumption is necessarily false.

Advertisements

One thought on “The return of the non-existent

  1. Salam sheikh.

    I came across your blog accidentally: I had assumed that with studies you had stopped blogging.

    ‘… Assume that sort of thing can happen. If so, then t would also have to return to existence alongside x, insofar as it [t?] is a part of what individuates x as x. …’

    Assuming that I understood your input correctly – that by ‘it’ you are referring to ‘time’, above in bracket, here is my reply:

    t, or, time, is not a part of what individuates x as x, but individuation of x is qua x, which is predicated of some categories that are individuative – substance, quality, quantity, etc., relative to time.
    And time, similar to place, in my opinion, is one of the non-individuative categories.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s