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One of the things Fakhr al-Din Razi (d. 1210) is known for is the systematic structure and lemmatization he introduced into Avicenna’s enigmatic Al-Isharat wa’l-Tanbihat in his commentary on that work. Below is an example of such structuring activity. It’s the table of contents for namat III  from his Sharh al-Isharat (ed. A. Najafzada, Tehran: Ajuman-i Athar wa Mafakhir-i Farhangi, 2005).

Namat III: On terrestrial and celestial souls

On making the soul known (ta’rif al-nafs)

Part I: On explaining that the soul is not equivalent to the body and the mixture and that it is one (wahida)
First question (mas’ala): On explaining that it is not equivalent to this body

Chapter 1: On showing that man is not unaware of the perception of himself under any conditions and that he knows his individual existence (inniyatihi) in a state of being unaware of his body and all his organs
Chapter 2: The subject of awareness (sha’ir) of the self (dhat) is not the internal senses
Chapter 3: The object of awareness (mash’ur) is not the internal senses
Chapter 4: That the soul is not perceived by the mediation of acts and effects

Second question: On explaining that the soul is not a mixture

Chapter 5: On explaining that the voluntary motion of man and his perception does not belong to his corporeality and the mixture of his body; rather, they are acts of his soul, and so the soul is other than something corporeal and the mixture.

Third question: On the unity of the soul and how affects the body and how the body affects it

Chapter 6: That the soul is a single thing and that it has branches (furu’) and capacities spread out in organs.

Part II: On the properties (ahkam) of perception
First question: On the quiddity of perception

Chapter 7: On the meaning of perception

Second question: On explaining the degrees of perceptions in abstraction

Chapter 8: On explaining the divisions of perception: sensation, imagination, and intellection; on their order (tartib) in abstraction and their properties.

Third question: On the internal senses

Chapter 9: On establishing (the internal) perceptive capacities and their states

Fourth question: On the ranks of human souls

Chapter 10: On enumerating the capacities of the human soul

Fifth question: The distinction between intuition (hads) and thinking

Chapter 11: On explaining the distinction between intuition and thinking

Sixth question: On establishing the sacred faculty

Chapter 12: On the sacred faculty

Chapter 13: On establishing the Active Intellect

Chapter 14: On explaining the existentiating (mawjida) cause of the conjunction of the soul with the Active Intellect

Chapter 15: On explaining the modality (kayfiyya) of the occurrence of the conjunction of the soul with the Active Intellect

Seventh question: That the rational soul is neither a body nor bodily

Chapter 16: On establishing that the human soul is neither a body nor bodily

Chapter 17: That the intellectual form is not divisible into parts similar in nature; and so it’s impossible that it be corporeal

Chapter 18: On resolving the doubt about the divisibility of the intellectual form into its particulars

Eighth question: That everything immaterial (mujarrad) is an intellect, intellecter, and intellected

Chapter 19: On showing that for anything immaterial it is possible to intellect itself

Chapter 20: On resolving the doubt against what he claimed in the previous chapter that an immaterial thing, when associated (qaranahu) with some other thing, must come to  intellect that other thing

Chapter 21: On dispelling the delusion that for the association there is a condition, which is the mental existence that was a condition for the truth of this association, and external existence was an obstacle to it

Chapter 22: A reminder of what he explained in the previous chapters.

Part III: On the properties of the motive faculty among the faculties of the soul
First question: On the division of the vegetative capacities

Chapter 23: preamble (tamhid) to the inquiry about the vegetative capacities

Chapter 24: On explaining the division of the vegetative capacities

Second question: On the voluntary motive capacities

Chapter 25: On explaining the orders of voluntary motions and their principles

Third question: That the sphere (falak) is in motion by volition (bi’l-irada)

Chapter 26: On showing that the motions of the spheres are animate and voluntary (nafsaniyya iradiyya)

Fourth question: On establishing celestial souls

Chapter 27: A premise (muqaddama) used in establishing the celestial souls

Chapter 28: On showing that the motions of the spheres have a principle which is a possessor (sahib) of a universal volition

Chapter 29: On establishing that the sphere has a principle which possesses a particular volition

Chapter 30: That a voluntary agent does not will an act unless it knows or thinks (zanna) or believes that that act is more appropriate (‘awla) for it than its nonexistence and [on] rebutting the objections to this principle (qa’ida)

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