This is an excerpt from a chapter of Mir Husayn Maybudi’s (d. circa 1503) commentary on the Kitab Hidayat al-Hikmah of Athir al-Din Abhari (d. 1265), a philosopher belonging to Ibn Sina’s school. Maybudi’s comments are on a chapter entitled ‘On the proof that the Necessarily Existent by virtue of Its essence is necessary in all of Its aspects (jihat).’ Basically, this section is where the principle of plenitude (i.e., that there are no potencies or, as Maybudi himself put it, ‘anticipated states not yet actualized’, in God) is firmly established.
[The Necessary’s] essence (dhat) is suﬃcient with respect to the attributes it possesses, and It is therefore necessary in all of Its aspects. […].
Maybudi comments on the above thus:
[…]. It has been said that the best [argument] proving this point is [the following]:
Everything which is possible (mumkin) for the Necessary [Existent] in the way of attributes is necessitated by Its essence.
Everything which is necessitated by Its essence is necessarily actualized.
Therefore, everything which is possible for the Necessary [Existent] is necessarily actualized.
As for the major premise, it is obvious. As for the minor premise, it is true because if it were not, then the necessity of existence of some of the attributes would be by virtue of something other than the essence [of the Necessary Existent]. And if that other were necessary by virtue of its essence, what is necessarily existent would be more than one. [This is false]. On the other hand, if that other were contingent, either it would be necessitated by the essence, in which case the essence would be the necessitator of those attributes we had assumed it did not necessitate, since the necessitator of a necessitator is also a necessitator, or that other would not be [necessitated by the essence], in which case it would be necessitated by some second necessitator and the argument would be transferred to it. Either the chain of necessitators would regress to inﬁnity, or else it would end with a necessitator necessitated by the essence, and that would be in contradiction to what had been assumed. The gist of this is that if the essence did not necessitate all of the attributes, then one of these impossibilities would result: either the multiplicity of the Necessary [Existent] or an inﬁnite regress, or the contradiction of what had been assumed. Therefore the essence [of the Necessary Existent] is the necessitator of all Its attributes, and the question is proven. […].